Since the uprisings Tunisia had been going through a “renegotiation” of what it should politically look like. Such processes are today addressed to the implementation of gender complementary in light of Art. 46 of the 2014 Constitution. A broken tabu the one of gender issue which in spite of the diatribes today has found a grade of freedom of speech within society. Furthermore, the fact that do exist a place for dissent on gender matters -which caused the eruption of many debates among the” union for the protection of men” vs. le movement Feministe Tunisien in its historical and leader activist consciousness- is compulsory of the inclusive nature and shape of new Tunisia, especially if compared to the case of Egypt , miles away from democracy and the consolidation of a civil society.
However, politically even though the management of domestic affairs in terms of strikes and abolishment of state expenditures has produced a slight financial improvements in rural areas ( an effect due also to the transnational policies ) the fulcrum of the debate between Secularism and extremism has shifted from the political narrative to urban spaces or better to slums, and it is with regard to this that the political parties next to civil actors and UGTT are called to take an incisive decision.
The mobilizing of society through strikes and the historical UGTT social struggles for workplaces and health services is compulsory to the need of progress required in regulating rights, but what about the condition of slums in the aftermath of the 2012 ? The 2014 Constitutional text, by contrast to what stated in the Egyptian one, does not limit or regulate the Salafist-jihadi inclusion in politics or society. Therefore, even though Tunisian state security is much more closer in terms of concreteness the lack of reforms in slums today can provide the jihadi branches to benefit from before the 2014 expected elections in order to foster dissent . This latter issue rather than being politically contrasted –as it is happening – should rather be economically seriously reconsidered in terms of development policies and decision making inclusive strategies , as the radicalization ( as occurred in Egypt during the 80’s and the 90’s in Boulaq ) today lies in the approaches to mobilize angered masses, social efforts by religious ethos let the Salafism or whatever form of religious approach to society to represent itself as the alternative to the State by principles of dawaa and hisba both far from Yusuf Al- Qaradawi’s post modern and more liberal doctrinal re-readings, but so close to the risk of the re-Islamizing of society, by reminding of Cairo experience -the motherland of corruption between State and State promoted Islam.
The Salafist escalation in Tunisia is exclusively symptomatic of the economic stagnancy and crisis between graduates. I was reading time ago Campanini’s book – a respected Italian Orientalist who approached to the reinterpretation of Political Islam from a social and political perspective after the 2011- in his statement if globalization is a net the region has economically swallowed in by principle of economic dependency generated by IMF’s default. I would not accuse the IMF or the World Bank itself, more likely the dynamics and plan of providing development policies in developing Countries, subordinated to the logic of corruption and interests before a mutual cooperation. The crisis of Tunisia in social terms is based on youth who were instrumental in the demise of the Ben Ali’s dictatorship, who have not been integrated, till today, into political parties or taken an active role in politics. There are hard struggles to find a formal political role and develop a political culture different from corrupt and self-serving models which responds to their future aspirations and vision for Tunisia.
For many young people today Jihadi Salafism offers an identity, a subculture, an inspirational opportunity to fight for something bigger than themselves, as governments are not producing any guarantees.
From this intricate background Ansar Al-Sharia keeps benefiting from its Libyan branch which with its call for charities campaign in the Libyan ethnic ongoing identity clashes is symptomatic – from one side- of the risk of fueling anger against the secularist counterparts represented by Ettakatol or Nida Tunis incapable of matching social demand for changes by disenfranchised youth, after four years since Bouazizi’s syndrome spread out as exacerbation of public debt, stagnancy, privatization, corruption, geographical-economic disparities. None of these unequal economic approach to politics has registered serious reforms in spite of the conspicuous budget addressed to by Western governments.
This is what is taking place today in Libya and about which no NGOs or stakeholder is rethinking local policies before state building and mainly peacekeeping actions. The depiction of moderate Islamists is very strong and dangerously addressed to the western audience today even more culturally socially and politically no educated to what Political Islam, at least doctrinally, could mean even though Ghannouchi’s ability, in some sense, is trying to reinterpret it in a very British-French ideological and social lesson of liberalism, so that for some aspects at a certain stage scholars wondered if Tunisia could have represented a model for Egypt. I do not guess so, for a matter of rule of law, symbolism of the Constitutional principles and state power abuse.
However, I see something ironic and rhetorical in the new US-Tunisia governmental approach to salafism-jihadism – to distinguish it from the ideology spread by salafyia ‘almyia. The shutting down of Islamist parties and NGOs in Egypt and the brutality of the repression, or the cracking down of terrorist groups in Tunisia is not limiting what is today defined a “cyber- terrorism” and “networking jihadi platforms”. Some people could assert that the power of those underground forms of networking mobilization is, in some sense, limiting the effectiveness of strategic counter-terrorism in the region. Nonetheless, by rethinking the US policies in the region and the moment of “peace” which Israel is magically experiencing in its phobia for securitization, I would rather say that the conspiracy theory concerning the Arab uprisings (driven by US from its Israeli office- as Gilbert Achcar reported in his most brilliant radical analysis of the uprising “The People Want”) finds a confirm in light of 1) the so slight economic reforms achieved 2) the completely schizophrenic way of processing counter-terrorism in spite of the many provisions and recommendations spread by International Crisis Group and aimed at implement new pluralist policies 3) the friendship and dialogue standing between US and Muslim Brotherhood which has recently been listed as “terroristic organization” not strangely next to Hamas in Palestine 4) the complete freedom addressed to jihadists on networking systems. What is the point of banning a group by keeping contacts with the creature that US itself created in the late 70’s beginning of 80’s pretending of calling for a de radicalization manoeuvres?
TYPES OF STANDARD JIHADI DE-RADICALIZATION (model provided by Omar Ashour)
- organizational de- radicalization: based on the dismantle of the organization by discharging their members without splits internet violence
- comprehensive de- radicalization based on the multilateral ideological, behavioural and organizational dismantlement
- substantive de-radicalization
- pragmatic de-radicalization it based on the behavioural –organizational de-radicalization process but without ideological de-radicalization process of violence (Algerian AIS is an example)
Furthermore, targeting Ansar Al-Sharia in late 2013 has today provided them with the privilege of clandestine status. This clandestine nature will in the next months and stages of the political transition create ambiguities, as whether attacks or bombings will take place the group is fully legitimated to deny any responsibilities. In addition, the strikes in the Capital next to the stable stagnancy or slight financial improvements are compulsory of the Salafist-jihadi manipulation of masses in slums.
Moreover, as it was not enough, the cracking down does not clash with the Constitutional principle of pluralist inclusivism, which means that the al Qaeda cell can legally operates through its divisions based on four senior leaderships.
Having stated that, at least from a tactical- doctrinal perspective, many critics should be seriously moved to the US and EU policies in the region and their pragmatic and discrepant way of approaching regional counter- terrorism ,far from what stated by ICG .
None of the a fore mentioned strategy of de-radicalization has been implemented in the aftermath of the uprising. When the Salafist-jihadi branches stood up in October 2013 for the dawaa campaign benefitting from the untruthfulness in political parties as actors of the transition, no local stakeholders has provided – and still is providing- a plan of public debt reduction and if strikes will last for the next months, Islamists will be more legitimated in processing the mobilization of masses.
Ennahda’s relationship with Salafist groups has been and it is problematic and confused but it not excluded from responsibilities in not struggling enough for a stabilization of the Country.
Etthadamen and Minhla micro projects
Etthadamen , as governatorate of Tunis made up of two suburban areas , witnessed in 1996 presumed international projects for development addressed to the implementation of social participation of 100 women and 100 youth. The micro credit project was supposed to last 4 years and the outcomes should have been based on the tangible establishing of micro credit and income access or activities promoting the role of women in working places. Indeed, Etthadamen is today only one of the many slums from which in October 2013 Ansar Al- Sharia set up its dawaa campaign through micro social projects providing access to credit and economic resources by effectively managing in the promotion, far from apparently corrupted ethos. Next to the economic and financial activities carried out in Tunisia the branch extended charities campaigns in Benghazi by fully meeting the support of local peoples disenfranchised from State discourse. If from one side it would sound “socially inclined”. Indeed Ansar activity is addressed to dismantle the spectrum of stability addressed to the 2014 Constitution text is not actually shaking the financial stagnancy of the Country which economic improvement miserably shifted from 3.8% to 4%. The unemployment rate today, in spite of the many open gates is 30%, too high for fueling trust in new governments or in the new “civil society in its Constitutional proud”. Even though some changes are actually occurred from a social perspective in terms of Constitutional gender equality and Constitutional voice assured to trade unions, where the role of UGTT has been crucial and still it is, as also here stated by industrial ALL General Secretary Jyrki Raina:
The role of UGTT and member unions, including yourselves, has not only been of crucial importance in achieving this constitution you have been a shining example of how the trade union movement can push for democracy and help change society.Jyrki Raina
The breaking point which the Tunisian government is urgently called today to work on engulfs the processing of political economic reforms addressed to rethink the role of moderate Islamists by controlling trafficking, smugglings and cross border linkages.
Furthermore, in the remapping of Al Qaeda’s structure, the cracking down of Ansar is useless to the destabilization of jihadism or salafism in the Maghreb if the decision will not be followed in the next months by actions addressed to the monitoring of the Algerian borders from which the organization economically depends in terms of arms trafficking and narcotics.
de-radicalization in Tunisia by development interfaith and secularist policies is a prerogative
As much of the literature on violence in Tunisia emphasizes the socio-economic dimensions of conflict, addressing such problems has been a central component of many of the practical recommendations. The international crisis group (ICG 2013) for example, contends that prior to embarking on a security-based response to the transition, the Tunisia government and international actors should aim to provide and wide-ranging social, educational, and employment support services to the population. One of the possible de-radicalization strategies supported is based on the following model proposed by GSDRC in January 2014 and contrasting the standardized types of de-radicalization afore mentioned.
- Filling the gap in terms of geo-economic disparities
- Bridging the border disparities – it would enable a more controlled power on gates from the western and eastern side which today are sanctuaries for extremist groups
- Implement with UGTT the civil right of access to working market
- Stark regional inequities
- Fight against corruption
- Reconsider the role addressed to youth in revolution – who have today been cut off of any roles in new established parties from both counterparts Islamists from Ennahda and secularist from Ettakatol or Nida Tunis
- Ennahda should reconsiders its social politics and Islamist approach
To sum, in this vortex of interests and ideological clashes, the recommendation is mainly addressed to the government –as democratically pointed out by the Crisis Group and Hinds in “Conflict Analysis in Tunisia”- which is today called to cooperate, following the Machiavelli’s political model, with the achieved Tunisian civil society before the elections and encourage initiatives between less violent Islamic, Islamist and secular organizations to address social and economic problems resolution or improvement before the democratic election without forgetting the successes Constitutionally achieved.
I quote 1:”The depiction of moderate Islamists is very strong and dangerously addressed to the western audience today even more culturally socially and politically no educated to what Political Islam, at least doctrinally, could mean even though Ghannouchi’s ability, in some sense, is trying to reinterpret it in a very British-French ideological and social lesson of liberalism, so that for some aspects at a certain stage scholars wondered if Tunisia could have represented a model for Egypt”
what the hell do you mean by this ? why don’t you use a proper punctuation? why don’t you make short and clear sentences instead of this chaotic nonsense ?
2″Even though some changes are actually occurred” occurred? do u mean occuring ?!
this article is a total failure; frankly I expected a logical and a substantial analysis mainly because I wan tempted with the title, but unfortunately the title turns out to be totally disconnected from what is in there.
please, do revise what you write, or demand others’ revision.
Machiavelli’s model implies political inclusive manouvres. In the case of tunisia,the banning of Ansar clashes with such principle. Therefore, the title is congruent with the goal of the work stressed out at the end of the article itself. Moreover the one of machiavelli was a social and politica intelligence. I advice you to read “The Prince”. Second thing, some changes occurred is correct. Third thing,Gannouchi is proving to reinterpret political islam “at the french-british way” as the ethical and ideological approaches of both mandates in the north africa-Egypt is included-are anchored to a certain degree of liberalism. This aspect is considered uncompatible with political islam’s ideology. A part from editing mistakes the sense is deep.
Med I seriously think you should read through “The Prince” by Machiavelli as the articles is an excursus of what is happening right now in Tunisia in a comparative approach to Egypt from a social politica perspective where the focus is the call for development theories.
It is a critical piece, and just at the end the author sums up the provisions and recommendations. Machiavelli is representative of the inclusive theory suggested.
well, it’s a complex and heavy article ..but it’s not failure, oh cm’on don’t be exagerrated!
Iam sorry but this article is really brimming with grammatical and structure mistakes to the point that you think of the writer as either being sleepy when writing it or that he/she underestimates his/her readership.
As for the Prince, thanks for the advise but I have already read it ;)
It is not enough to enumerate and jump from one idea to another throughout the body of the article and then come in the last paragraphe and say hell yeah this sums up Machiavelli’s political model. the idea should be visible and recurrent throughout the whole article so that the reader can follow. I have nothing against the title and the ideas but the methodology and the way to develop arguments should be put into question.
Since I am noticing how the attacks have been intensified, I decided to let you know the steps you missed in the reading, in first person ( even though I consider it far from my professional ethics). The article, as pointed out in other more positive feedbacks, is mainly an excursus or a general rethinking of the Tunisia transition. The logical interdependence of the paragraphs opens up with a positive critics to the 2014 Constitution with regard to Art. 46 in terms of gender equality to mean that something is changing in the country, by constrast to Egypt. The second part is a critics to state expenditures and how in spite of the reductions, strikes go on and the role of UGTT is not incisive in action, as it is not producing changes in the jobmarket. As consequence, the Salafists are benefitting from such economic stagnancy which miserably shifted from 3.8 to 4% ( I encourage you to read The people want) . The problem is however also addressed to youth marginalization. In such framework Ansar Al Sharia is managing in mobilizing masses from slums, and the case of Etthadamen is representative of the ongoing social crisis. The articles, as probably to missed, states that jihadism has become since 2011 ” a subculture and an opportunity” for many youth..the same youth disenfranchised from State discourse. The proposed models of de-radicalization have not been implemented, and I retained opportune to list them. Cracking down Ansar in such framework will produce a boomerang effect in the next months. The call for Machiavellian’s intelligentsia means mainly the need to call all counterparts to discuss more pluralist policies from slums ( I refer to development policies) , and in such doing Ansar (in light of its charitable ethos, a common aspect in all Islamist movements) should be reintegrated in society. That is the Machiavelli’s social intelligence. Of course, that is a journalistic piece, not addressed to any academic journals, therefore I just wrote down an input which implies the rethinking of bigger issues concerning social and political models . I should have mentioned also Max Weber and the principle of compatibility with Islam, Durkheim’s social model..with reference to slums, or Aristotle and the Empirism with regard to the relation standing between economic instititution building and economic growth. That is not the write place for extending philosophical, political or economic implications. Methodology is a specific and complex way of developing a thesis addressed to 5.000 words works. I could agree with regard to the silly editing mistakes in the first quote, but about which also Nawaat asked me sorry as they missed the editing. I will awaiting for you piece, in order to have further exchange discussions, in the hope they will be more constructive and intellectually inclined. Best.
Quote: “The depiction of moderate Islamists is very strong and dangerously addressed to the western audience today even more culturally socially and politically no educated to what Political Islam, at least doctrinally, could mean even though Ghannouchi’s ability, in some sense, is trying to reinterpret it in a very British-French ideological and social lesson of liberalism, so that for some aspects at a certain stage scholars wondered if Tunisia could have represented a model for Egypt. ”
Considering that Ghannouchi a “moderate” islamist is a big failure if not a silly assumption that unveils a deep ignorance of this man’s career.
Considering that Ghannouchi is attempting to reinterpret Islam in the light of “British-French ideological and social lesson of liberalism” is also a big joke! I’m sorry but you should refer to some serious documentation before throwing such incoherencies. Anyways, there is room for improvement !
Tounis, your ways of trolling authors or academics makes me laugh! take a look at this and then come back tell us if the article is right or not. No doubt the author is extremely learned.
Quote 1 Secularism does not conflict with the principles of Islam, according to Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouch
Quote 2 (Reuters) – Tunisian Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi is seen by many secularists as a dangerous radical, but for some conservative clerics who see themselves as the benchmark of orthodox Islam — he is so liberal that they call him an unbeliever
Quote 3 With regard to the growing confrontations with Salafist groups, particularly at educational institutions and mosques, Ghannouchi described Salafists as “the fruit of a dictatorial regime”. He called for dialogue with them and embracing them to exit this conflict
Quote 4 “The state should not have anything to do with telling people what to wear, what to eat and drink, what they should believe in by Rashid Ghannouchi
Quote 5 “His views have always been considered quite liberal,” says Maha Azzam of the Chatham House “He was able to return after over two decades in exile… and still win the hearts and minds of the young
Quote 6 (Religionscope) Al-Ghannouchi is widely regarded to represent the most liberal and progressive strand in Arab Islamist politics. Born in 1941 in Qabis province (southern Tunisia) he received higher education in Cairo, Damascus and the Sorbonne in Paris. In 1981 Al-Ghannouchi founded the Al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency) which was renamed Hizb al-Nahda (aka Hizb Ennahda) or the Renaissance Party in 1989
Also, you probably should be educated as you forgot the meaning of the French Colonialization and the Turkish Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’ s influence in YOUR Country!
Quote 6 https://nawaat.org/portail/2013/09/22/mustafa-kemal-un-grand-homme-de-lhistoire/
Thank you to your ignorance, and no because I’m liberal ..but yeah there is room for your improvements ;D have fun mate!
I could not link the figure of Ghannouchi next to the one of any other Islamist leaders..he’s a “moderate” leader in the Country for his putting politics ! but I see something risking..not sure if he will implement a “French liberalism from the French British social lesson”. this is a little bit risking, time will tell us. the quote is not a joke ..just risking,a little bit.
1- Waww! You’re truly liberal ! If you are so, you should not make people know it because we are not here about who’s liberal and who’s not! This is the way of nadhaouists to defend their positions “I’m not nahdhaouis but I support her government”! so you burned your cover ! But I don’t care!
2- I’m not trolling the author. I just commented this long text full of incoherencies and misses.
3- Your quotes have no value because there is a clear American will to cover and deal with Islamism in Arab countries where some dictators were ousted by their fellow citizens (We can spend all the day arguing for and against). But, these mostly western media (the first frontline of the American administration) are bleaching islamists like your Ghannouchi for this reason. By the way, I can give you a dozen of other NYTimes and WP articles and political “analyses” about “Ennahdha’s Miracle” (this sounds strangely like ZABA’s miracles, isn’t it?)!
4- I accused the author of ignorance regarding Ghannouchi’s career and I reiterate my accusation here. Your Ghannouchi has called people for jihad against the West from Khartoum in 1990 and authorized his troops to what is called by historians “Initiative Liberation” and resulted in dozens of terrorist attacks in Tunisia, a brutal confrontation between ZABA and islamists in the country and significantly contributed to turn Tunisia into an open-sky prison for more than 23 years. Stop dogma man !
I’m sorry, the previous comment is addressed to Alaa and not Djerba.
And these are two more things for the brilliant liberal defending Ghannouchi’s “moderation”.
1- Most of the quotes you gave in you post are related to what your Ghannouchi has said to foreign press! Everyone knows the ambivalence and the ambiguity that characterize the speeches of your “moderate” Ghannouchi. In addition, you are trying to emphasize that Salafists are the bad guys but your Ghannouchi is the good one ! Well!, you’re telling people another joke because your Ghannouchi said that Salafists are like “sons” for him and they “remember him his youth”. You have in the previous post a video that tells you what Ghannouchi’s youth looks like. This said, western media are bleaching Islamism and particularly Muslim Brotherhood for strategic reasons. You should be blind to be unable to see it. Dogma make people blind and dough.
2- I assumed that the author is meaning the British-French Liberal system what is deeply related to the political regime. The author is not speaking about the cultural neither the educational impact of French and Kemalist systems on Tunisia. You should not hijack the discussion. The author is only repeating another urban legend about your Ghannouchi, another myth mistakenly saying that your Ghannouchi took advantage of his British asylum in order to be more “moderate” and more “democratic”. And this hypothetical British-political-culture impact had influenced Ennahdha’s and her leader’s views about democracy and rule of law. This is wrong! The thirty-month mandate of Ennahdha’s rule can give you thousands of counter examples! Just open your eyes and get out of the troop!
To finish, this is a little gift for you and all the dogmatic nadhaouists who are defending the “moderate” and “democratic” Ghannouchi. A bit of history told by one of the frontline nahdhaouis in the 1990s. Cheers!
I think Tounsi don’t like Ghannouchi and that is then he tries to attack . Just ignore and go back to the article. That man was exiled, spent many years of his life between France and London. No doubts he used to be “more radical” in the 90’s or things like that AND I AM SURE WE ALL KNOW THAT. We have to keep up in mind that he also changed the name of the party so that to avoid direct contact to Islam. And yes, today he’s one of the most “moderate” Islamist leaders. This article is not about Ghannouchi, in any cases. You’re all are making too much of three lines and on “Ghannouchi’s career” …!! I assume.. that the author is quite reasonable to know who Ghannouchi was and is today ( cm’on there is also Wikipedia) if in the West he’s well acclaimed by media or critics as highlighed by @Alaa..well that’s nothing we can do!! just accept that today something changed in this man..he’s not Ahmadinejad’s bro, please!!
Thanks for your comment. I just want to underline that there are no ties between hatred nor love and what I wrote about Ghannouchi’s career. It was just a call to reread history with critical eyes. But if you are insisting on that, I would tell you that I “hate” ZABA, Sebsi, Ghannouchi, Hamma and all those who made the modern Tunisian politics so awful and disgusting the same way!
This said, I would argue that Wikipedia is not enough to learn about Ghannouchi’s career! The guy is the leader of ambivalence and ambiguity in Tunisia. One day, he tells foreign media that Ennahdha is a “civil and democratic” party who would not change the “lifestyle of modern Tunisia” and the next day, he gathers the most radical salafists and tells them openly, “The army is not guaranteed neither the security forces”. It is wiser to “start working on the ground by building Islamic schools, camps and organizations”, and don’t worry about the constitution, “only the strongest can interpret the law”!
Above all, what motivated me to answer the “liberal” Alaa is the fact that the prevalent rhetoric is always the same from one side or the other, a herd of cheeps that praises the Zaiim, Imam, Cheick, and Caid with no minimum critical judgment and regardless of the nation’s supreme interests! At this level, there are almost no differences between Ghannouchi’s Chocotom hordes and Sebsi band of dancers who are drawing huge banners in the streets claiming that their Sebsi is “the leader and the protector”. Is there any critical approach towards the offences against human-rights that their Sebsi had led under Bourguiba’s regime? or regarding his active role in vote frauds of 1981 and 1989 as well? similarly about zenbawi, hamma troops, etc.!
I have an extreme sensitivity against these brain-washed herds of mules who invaded the public space and prevented any real revolution that makes Tunisia a country of justice, freedom and wealth! Those people who are licking the boots of their leaders pretending that they are prophets sent to free a country that would never live what we lived and are living if these dinosaurs were not involved within the country history. It is time to shred out all the fetish figures and bitter past ghosts still haunting our dreams.
either the video you post dated back to the 1990!!!!!!!
Of course Ghannouchi today is holder of so many hypocritical cash-interests that is why he shifted and set his mind-set!! What you said is true but I think the author just focused on today but yeah I also think like Sadq that it is and we all are quite reasonable to know who Ghannouchi was and is today.
Said that, thanks for the opinion exchanges and thanks to the “controversial shaking mind ” article for having fuelled this conversation ;)