It is unprecedented since the fall of the Ben Ali regime. The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the country’s most popular union and most capable of galvanizing citizens to action, has suddenly deserted the streets, and its leaders are no longer to be seen in the media. What explains the organization’s absence from the social movement and current mobilization for rights and freedoms? The question is a baffling one for observers of the political scene and unions in Tunisia.
This immobility conveys the image of an organization that has been deflated along with its most active structures such as the Regional Unions of Tunis and Sfax. The UGTT has never concealed its hostility towards the government’s new orientations—persecution, condemnation of candidates in presidential elections, the devastating impact of the infamous article 54, and vindictive, demonizing discourse…all of which are symptomatic of a return to authoritarianism and despotism. However, these positions have not translated into on-the-ground mobilization as in previous years, when citizens would gather in Place Mohamed Ali in response to transgressions committed by different governments prior to July 25, 2021.
The last action organized by the Union at the seat of government, the Kasbah, took place in March 2024. That day, Secretary General Noureddine Taboubi lashed out at the government for threats and arrests targeting unionists like Anis Kaabi, secretary general of the Union of Société Tunisie Autoroutes (STA) agents, and Sanki Assoudi, secretary general of the Regional Union of Kasserine. While Kaabi was released following his arrest, Assoudi was imprisoned. In a fiery discourse, Taboubi evoked threats against rights and freedoms in general. He also demanded the fulfillment of signed agreements and a return to dialogue with government representatives.
The UGTT’s choice to step out of the fray seems to have much to do with the complexity of Tunisia’s political crisis and its difficult resolution. Especially within the context of a public media blackout and the self-censorship that has silenced private media outlets.
None of this, however, should obscure the internal crisis that has destabilized the organization. Characterized as a management crisis, the conflict has blurred the vision of all structures within the Union to the extent that their leaders are unable to gauge the situation and measure the impact of a large mobilization that is likely to spill over onto political demands. This likelihood has forced the Union to concentrate all of its efforts on reconciling internal divergences.
Under government pressure, internal crisis intensifies
Everything started during the UGTT’s special congress, held in Sousse in July 2021 to revise the organization’s internal regulations. Today, the situation has become so complicated that it is difficult for leaders to find a solution, even after the issue was addressed by the UGTT’s second authority, the National Council. During the first week of September, the Council convened but produced no solution. Instead, a poisonous atmosphere led the body to suspend its work; leaders and members have remained silent about proposed exit strategies. Characterized by some as a “management crisis,” the conflict continues to affect the organization’s dynamism, mobility, and even the regularity of meetings held by its different bodies. This includes the UGTT’s executive bureau, which has not convened since September 7.
Successive attacks by the government in attempt to diminish the influence of Tunisia’s most powerful union have exacerbated the organization’s internal crisis. Beyond the harassment and denigration campaigns targeting unionists, pressure has mounted from the union opposition which was created following the amendment of article 10 of the UGTT’s internal regulations. This provision became article 20 during the Sousse congress which was held in the midst of the Covid pandemic. The amendment allowed executive bureau members to run for more than two consecutive terms, while also requiring the renewal of one-third of its composition. These modifications heightened the internal conflict to the degree that some even suggested, among other things, appointing a successor for Secretary General Noureddine Taboubi. Taboubi’s reaction seemed to signal the beginning of fragmentation. One day prior to the National Council meeting, he declared,
Those who are hoping for fracture and division within the UGTT are mistaken (…) In all of our meetings, we have disagreements and confrontations within our house, ideological confrontations, but we agree to disagree in order to create content, strengthen the immunity of the nation and serve the interests of workers.
Consensual or special congress?
When it became clear—after July 25, 2021 and the ensuing scramble to adapt to the political upheaval which the country was facing—that there were conflicting ideas about the UGTT’s management, a redistribution of tasks within the organization’s executive bureau was proposed. The “tactical” objective of this redistribution was to precipitate the replacement of that body’s current secretary general, Noureddine Taboubi, by another member of the bureau. The proposal did not succeed in staving off the crisis that threatened the organization, but instead quickly pulled it away from the national stage and prevented it from mobilizing—as it once had—to confront the numerous transgressions of the regime in power. All the more so because, ever since its creation, the UGTT’s image and aura have been associated with the charisma of its secretary general, to whom the organization’s internal regulations grant extensive powers.
The absence of a consensus regarding the choice of Taboubi’s successor can be explained by a number of factors that are not unfamiliar to observers of union life in Tunisia. First of all, candidates for the position of secretary general must possess highly particular qualities such as a predisposition to distinguish oneself from any partisan or ideological affiliation, to manage union conflicts and to appease the political currents across different union sectors. All of these qualities have proven insufficient on account of the regional factor, a dimension which threatens to complicate things. It is indeed what caused the organization to bring the crisis to its National Council in the beginning of September in Monastir.
During the meeting, two formulas were proposed to remedy the internal crisis and diverging opinions which have destabilized the organization founded by Farhat Hached. The first: to hold a special elections congress, either ahead of, or on, the date initially fixed; this proposal would hold to the UGTT’s tradition of presenting a consensus-based official list as well as the name of the candidate to succeed Taboubi. A few names were effectively put forward, albeit indirectly or unofficially, including that of former executive bureau member, Abdelkrim Jrad. Jrad claimed the advantage of his ability to conciliate political-ideological neutrality and a regional foothold, owing to the fact that he is a native of the region of Sfax whose influence within the Union is significant.
Nevertheless, the National Council did not move forward with either of the two proposals. Nor did it draw up any other possible solutions for the crisis. In fact, the Council’s work was suspended, and the meeting left open until further notice following heated debates and the withdrawal from the meeting of several regional representatives headed by Youssef Aouadni, secretary general of the region of Sfax.
Part two (articles 11 – 14) of the UGTT’s internal regulations stipulates that the National Council is second to the General Congress in its decision-making power. It has the authority to make decisions and monitor the implementation of decisions made by the Congress within the framework of the UGTT’s general choices. It is composed of a vast representation of the organization’s structures, including the secretary generals of local unions and university chapters within the organization.
What the union opposition proposes
The union opposition, or what is called the Union Forum for the Integration of Democratic Practice and Respect of the Organization’s Statutes, constitutes one source of pressure that weighs heavily upon the UGTT. It was created following the amendment of what was formerly article 10 and which became article 20 after the special non-election congress.
The Union Forum, to which the UGTT holds no official obligations, is primarily composed of former unionists from intermediary structures and base unions. Among them, Taieb Bouaicha, who was a member of the executive bureau of the General Union of Secondary Education when the UGTT’s current spokesperson, Sami Tahri, served as secretary general prior to 2011.
This opposition proposes the creation of a temporary governing body to replace the national executive bureau. Its mission will be to oversee the restructuring of the Union, from base unions to the intermediary structures of regional unions and organizations across different sectors. This body will also operate to convoke a national congress before electing a new executive bureau and secretary general to replace the UGTT’s current leadership.
But the Union Forum has run into a number of legal obstacles in its proposal, especially in relation to the organization’s internal regulations which exclude individuals who do not belong to its structures from running for elections or acting on behalf of the Union. Furthermore, the UGTT refuses to negotiate or express itself outside of its structures, in spite of growing pressure from the Union Forum. According to rumors circulating around Place Mohamed Ali, the opposition is banking on a government attack against the UGTT and its leadership. Such an attack would enable the Union Forum to take control of the UGTT.
Crisis or differences in opinion?
In an interview with Nawaat, UGTT Assistant Secretary General Samir Cheffi refuses to characterize what is going on within the organization as a “crisis.” According to Cheffi, it is a question of simple differences in opinion and points of view. Cheffi considers this normal, “given the vast diversity which characterizes the composition of the organization at different levels of its central, regional, sectoral and local structures.” He adds,
The National Council was held in exceptional circumstances due to the extremely complex situation facing the country economically, socially and politically. Obviously, the Union cannot be sheltered from this situation, which explains why the work of the Council was rough at certain moments.
According to Cheffi, the National Council approved decisions which support maintaining the restriction of social dialogue, sideline concluded agreements, and offer no real solution to appease the suffering of citizens, Tunisian workers and employees. He argues that focusing on the negative effects which resulted from a revision of the UGTT’s internal regulations, particularly in relation to article 20, brings nothing new to the table. For him, the organization’s present challenge is internal democracy.
Between outspoken action and silent combat
Today, in spite of lawsuits against figures with an influence on public opinion, especially journalists, human rights activists and unionists—all targeted by decree 54— Cheffi considers that the organization “hasn’t been absent.” He insists that the Union has not stood by passively, “but always raised its voice and never ceased in warning against and denouncing the numerous coercive measures targeting liberties and political, economic and social rights.”
Cheffi continues: “As for public and individual liberties and union rights, we have not ceased to call for the abrogation of decree 54 and the respect for freedom of opinion. No one can ignore the Union’s positions and the role it plays in this regard. Saying that the Union would have stepped aside in order to avoid affiliation with the National Salvation Front is not at all correct (…) As a coalition of parties, they have the right to express their opinions and to act, and our disaccord with them does not necessarily mean that we must close our eyes to real and legitimate questions.”
Cheffi points out that his organization’s position on the political situation is “clear and known by all.” For him, the return to restricted freedoms and pressure on “intermediary bodies” such as political parties, organizations and associations are signs of real danger. He asserts that the UGTT will not accept “a return to the past in any form.”
The last straw
It is well known that the president does not believe in intermediary bodies whose orbit does not revolve around him, i.e. unions, parties and associations. Also apparent is the head of state’s eagerness to appropriate all progress on major issues, even in preliminary stages of their resolution. This approach is evident during his work visits and meetings with members of government and high officials within the administration.
Most of these issues have been the object of negotiations and discussions with the UGTT and the employers’ organization (UTICA), sometimes in the presence of the International Labour Organization (ILO). These discussions were suspended due to deep-seated disagreements, before being officially interrupted with the suspension of work led by the National Council for Social Dialogue (CNDS).
The Compensation Fund for Job Loss outlined in the 2025 finance draft law constitutes a similar case. For three years, the topic was a strong point in tripartite discussions between the government, UTICA and UGTT, the latter represented by former executive bureau member Abdelkrim Jrad. Today, the government is determined to act independently, introducing the Fund within the context of the finance law without having to specify how it is to be created and financed.
Another big issue: increasing the Guaranteed Interprofessional Minimum Wage (SMIG), traditionally announced during a joint meeting between the government and the UGTT. The most recent increase, however, did not honor that tradition, and was instead approved during a Council of Ministers meeting held on July 4.
But the UGTT’s exclusion from issues relating to its scope of functions does not stop there. Certain sources report that the government recently began discussions with the UTICA on a revision of the labor code, without inviting UGTT representatives to the table. This, after so many instances of marginalization, seems to have been the last straw.
Despite all of this, Samir Cheffi is undeterred:
I don’t think that the government and those in power in general are looking to pull the rug out from under the Union or to push it out and replace it, for example in relation to the issue of increasing the SMIG, or in unilaterally addressing matters such as subcontracting (…) The Union is a stakeholder in all current issues.
For Cheffi, “If the government’s strategy is to exclude the UGTT and to act alone in its search for solutions to social and economic problems, this will only further exacerbate accumulated crises. We know, however, that these crises can only be resolved by dialogue, which remains one of the organization’s major demands, and the only alternative to ongoing demonstrations and strikes, which we fall back on as a final resort.”
Inevitable return to the street
The government’s tendency to marginalize the UGTT and circumvent social dialogue has pushed the organization to its limits. In tandem with its efforts to restore order within, the Union’s leadership has instructed the National Council to call general strikes in the civil service and across all of the public sector. The objective of these strikes is to achieve the fulfillment of social demands, outlined by the Council in its professional resolution.
Soon after the National Council pronounced its resolution, the Civil Service Syndicate adopted its own; On October 2, the latter called for the implementation of protest movements in all sectors of the civil service, in addition to a national demonstration at the Kasbah in anticipation of the Syndicate’s meeting with regional structures. The UGTT’s national leadership will subsequently fix the dates for strikes as they gain momentum. Unless, of course, there are any last minute developments.
Cheffi affirms that the sustained blockage of the social dialogue, the failure to honor concluded agreements, plus the absence of real solutions to the problems of plummeting purchasing power and quality of life for citizens, Tunisian workers and employees, have left the Union no other choice than to play its legal role and social function in supporting workers. Our interlocutor argues that if the door to dialogue remains closed, the organization will be forced to seek recourse to alternative legal approaches. This would primarily entail holding strikes, an idea approved by a majority of the Union’s National Council members during an in-depth debate on the situation in the country.
Strikes represent the solution that is most disagreeable to unionists. But if we are forced to employ this tactic, we will not falter. We hope to find solutions before being obligated to take this route.
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