Peak season of olive oil production having recently come to an end, the month of April has seen a host of competitions in cities across the globe to discern this year’s highest quality olive oils and acknowledge outstanding producers.

Peak season of olive oil production having recently come to an end, the month of April has seen a host of competitions in cities across the globe to discern this year’s highest quality olive oils and acknowledge outstanding producers.
At the beginning of March, another modification was issued via Committee Implementing Regulation 2015/380 to suspend the issuing of importation certificates and to respond to requests for olive oil with an allocation coefficient of 5,451531%. In order to understand how these regulations reflect and effect the production and export of Tunisian olive oil, Nawaat visited the Tunisian Board of Olive Oil (ONH) in Tunis.
Since the departure of Ben Ali which symbolized the end of a decades-long case of “state capture,” the push to flesh out US-Tunisia trade relations has manifested in State-driven initiatives to stimulate foreign investment and in calls to adopt a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Among the forces pushing for the facilitation of foreign investment, the American Chamber of Commerce in Tunisia is lobbying for national regulatory reforms—specifically the Investment Code and laws governing intellectual rights—as well as a new bilateral trade agreement.
Articles and reports in foreign media on Tunisian olive oil have been manifold since the beginning of the year, prompted by an EU regulation to accommodate Tunisia’s “excellent season” and US interest in promoting and facilitating the export of Tunisian olive oil to the States. The following is an overview of Tunisia’s olive oil industry and affiliated ministries, institutions, and foreign markets who influence the production and export of Tunisia’s historically symbolic and gastronomically essential commodity, ingredient, source of wealth.
Earlier this month, Nawaat visited one of four regions in Tunisia where the French Compagnie Générale des Salines de Tunisie, or COTUSAL, extracts and produces salt for the local market and for export. The ensuing report, which elicited a prompt response from the company, is the most recent in a series of articles from the past year that explore the legal, economic, and environmental implications of the company’s operations in Tunisia.
From a socio-political perspective, an index that measures “economic freedom” is at first glance misleading. Certainly a significant factor in the discrepancy between The Heritage Foundation’s perspective on poverty and prosperity and the economic, social, and political realities that ordinary citizens face are contrasting interpretations and applications of the word “freedom.” Ironically, many Tunisians who experience what they perceive to be a lack of economic freedom recognize institutions that embrace free-market ideals as culpable for or complicit in economic insecurity.
In this newest publication, World Bank economists Antonio Nucifora and Bob Rijkers reiterate this background of corruption, characterized by «limited competition and active state intervention» and of which enduring vestiges are manifest in «three dualisms, namely the onshore-offshore division, the dichotomy between the coast and the interior, and the segmentation of the labor market»– to explain the present economic crisis that is its legacy.
As per Ridha Bouzouada’s claim that Circle Oil had justified reporting an important discovery as «nothing but a simulation based on drilling work,» L’Economiste Maghrébin has asked whether or not the Irish oil company might not have contrived the results of its drill findings to boost its numbers on the London Stock Exchange. Affiliated Tunisian institions and, by extension, Tunisian media, generally sparing in their (public) treatment of issues concerning foreign investment in the energies and hydrocarbon sectors, may in this case be spudding a more valuable “pontential large discovery” than that which has been so vastly and insouciantly associated with Circle Oil’s operations in Tunisian oilfields.
In contrast to what one hears on the streets about the dirth of natural resources that little Tunisia has to offer in the way of access to the global market, the cropping-up of press releases and studies in foreign press over the past decade or so intimate the titillation of petro-oil companies at prospects of investing in gas and oil exploration and production in the democratically-inclined ‘bright spot’ of the Arab World.
Will continuing threats of strikes, milk siphoned across borders and spilled onto streets, and official demands for reforms within the dairy industry inspire more interest in prioritizing the needs of a suffering agricultural sector? Until now, articles and current issues of agricultural significance prompt little public response in comparison to other highly mediatized and provocative and agriculturally-relevant issues such as immigration, smuggling of contraband, border tensions, unemployment, international economic cooperation and trade.
It is curious timing indeed that the report should be completed just before the Prime Minister’s official visit to Washington to entice American entrepreneurs to invest in Tunisia. In an interview with the Washington Post, Jomaa expressed intentions to pursue economic reforms that conceivably align with World Bank-propelled reforms: “The big trend for Tunisia is to encourage all private initiatives”.
That this report diffuses information which was previously inaccessible is a feature not to be overlooked or undervalued. In the wake of revolution and the unfolding democratic transition, the study’s objectives are relevant, its approach and resources transparent, its conclusions meticulously drawn and valuable to common knowledge and future research…However, a subtle but noteworthy contradiction associated with the confused designation of Tunisia as victim of state capture and as a role model for other countries reflects a greater, underlying discrepancy that exists at the institutional level.
What Jomâa did not say regarding contrasting political visions amongst the Gulf countries visited on his trip will weigh heavily not only on international relations and the actual support that Tunisia might receive from its alliances, but on the conditions for the support (if any) offered. Meanwhile images of blood-stained earth and bullet hole-scarred buildings permeate national news following clashes between national security forces and militants in Jendouba and Sidi Bouzid.
We all work for the IMF now. And if you haven’t realized that yet, I urge you to wake up to your new condition so you will not be caught unprepared. The sooner we all realize that, the smaller (hopefully!) the shock will be.
First of all, the failure of the rating agencies before the subprime crisis is complete and total. That’s an undeniable fact and the huge effort that those agencies are making to restore their credibility will not, in any way, change that fact. And you should not listen to anyone who is telling you otherwise even if that person is Patrick Raleig.
I am writing to set the record straight about an article you recently published about Standard & Poor’s sovereign ratings methodology, and particularly its application to Tunisia, entitled “Standard & Poor’s cuts Tunisia’s rating: limited methodology or bad intentions?”. The article contains numerous factual errors and repeats false allegations against us, several of which I list below.
It is important to note that since 2012 until the present day, the country has accumulated about ten million dollars in debt. In this vicious cycle where a debt is used to pay another debt, it is important to ask the following questions: Where will this debt take us? Where does the money go? Are the government’s cessions sufficient?
London, 28 February 2013 — Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded Tunisia’s government debt rating to Ba1 from Baa3, and […]