In recent months, Lebanon has been alive with rumours about a forthcoming devaluation. In mid-September, the governor of the Central Bank, Riadh Salameh was obliged to officially deny that he was ill and had to resign and Michel Aoun, the President of the Republic, also had to declare that the Lebanese pound was in good health and that the country was not on the road to bankruptcy. For every Lebanese these factors are indeed closely related since all know that the country is deep in debt.
The demonstrations in the summer of 2018 put the economic policies pursued since the late 1980s back at the heart of public debate in Jordan. The dispute has opened up a political space that had disappeared since the failure of the “November” 2012 conflagration, and brought the issue of taxation back to the forefront of the discussions. Extending the debate to the global economic approach has at least made it possible to question several central points of the official discourse, in particular the recurring subject of debt reduction.
The second Intifada used a large network of parallel and informal financial assistance to provide material and logistical support to the Palestinian resistance. That is why Israel has imposed reforms on the Palestinian Authority that have played a decisive role in its control strategy. Presented as a step towards good governance and the fight against corruption, they contributed to the halt given to the Intifada after the death of Yasser Arafat.
Despite the supposedly opposing political systems in place in Egypt and Syria since the 1970s, the two countries have developed similar economic reforms, particularly since the 1990s. In both cases, and beyond the differences, they allowed the elites to strengthen themselves, and the dictatorship to continue.
In North Africa, central banks independence from political powers is a matter of debate. It faces many obstacles and also raises countless criticisms from those who fear that countries will abandon their national sovereignty.
In November 2016, Tunis hosted an international conference, Tunisia 2020. Co-organised by the Tunisian, French and Qatari governments, its ambition was to garner from the “friendly countries” in attendance investment pledges for projects contributing to growth and job creation as well as significant financial support. The problem is that the promised financial support appears never to have been forthcoming, and the Tunisian government has been obliged to go into debt on the financial markets. This situation has prompted several observers to wonder publicly: “Where are Tunisia’s friends?”
Bitterness, disgust, anger were feelings commonly expressed when we spoke with Tunisian employees working at foreign NGOs based in Tunisia. Today, several individuals open up about the economic discrimination experienced by local personnel working in foreign non-profit organizations.
Since October 3, Saudi planes have launched into Tunisian skies, where joint military exercises are underway with Tunisian air forces. A statement issued by the Kingdom’s defense ministry describes the exercises as « highlighting the capabilities, professionalism and readiness of the Saudi airforce ». Such capabilities, which the Saudi regime seeks to « refine » with the help of Tunisia, were demonstrated on August 9 of this year when it targeted a school bus in Sana’a, Yemen, killing 29 children. With Saudi-Tunisian joint military exercises underway, Tunisia has provided Saudi Arabia with the airspace it needs to sharpen its knives before shedding more blood in Yemen.
Beginning in October, farmers in Tunisia’s northwest, particularly Beja, Jendouba, Zaghouan, will begin planting cereal crops like wheat and barley and leguminous crops including chickpea, lentil and faba which will both feed soil and stock pantries. A select few farmers in the region will also plant canola, an industrial oilseed supplied by French agribusiness giant Groupe AVRIL who is partnering with the Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture to develop a canola sector that is « 100% Tunisian ». The project is in fact part of a decades-long push to introduce canola as a « locally grown » alternative to imported grains and oils.
Wednesday 26 September was a momentous day at the court of First Instance of Gafsa. Emotions ran high as the activists and leaders of the uprising of the Gafsa Mining Basin of 2008 walked into the same court room in which they were beaten up, unfairly tried and sentenced less than 10 years ago. Only this time, they walked in through the main door as victims waiting to see the perpetrators prosecuted- not defendants accused of plotting against the state. Their only crime in 2008? Daring to peacefully protest what they considered to be unfair employment practices, nepotism and lack of transparency by the state-owned Phosphate Company of Gafsa, the region’s main – if not sole – employer.
3ich Tounsi has been the subject of lots of talk over the past months, suscitating a number of questions in its overexposure. Mega-events with ambiguous objectives, copiously-sponsored television and internet ads, opaque funding sources—such characteristics render 3ich Tounsi a veritable extra-terrestrial to the non-profit world, especially when it comes to the association’s discourse which has become more and more openly political.
Rouhanyet Mystic Fest is celebrating Season of Peace, its third edition which takes place from September 5-9 in Tunis’ postcardesque Sidi Bou Saïd. Organized by actor Hichem Rostom and wife Sana Ezzine, the event claims to be a « spiritual gathering based on mystic arts, sufism, sacred musics and all expressions of spirituality », offering festival-goers a smattering of yoga sessions, crystal healing and nightly musical concerts with the likes of Yuma and Labess. But amidst festival slogans of « peace, love, tolerance and fraternity », several artists from the previous edition are calling, quite simply, to be paid for their work.
Deterioration of the economic situation, soaring rent prices and feeble government intervention—all factors that contribute to an increase in the number of homeless individuals in the streets of Tunis, estimated at 3,000 in 2014. Ever more present on the streets, around transit stations, outside building entrances, in public gardens and elsewhere, they are a symptom of rampant social misery and marginalizing conservatism.
In June 2017, Tunisia’s Ministry of Civil Society and Human Rights pledged to reform the legal framework regulating associations, an attempt to « harmonize » the sector with the fight against terrorism and money laundering. The government’s proposal to amend Decree 88 of 2011, widely regarded as an important gain of the revolution for freedom of association, was perceived as a significant threat to this constitutional right. But while Tunisian and international civil society organizations had their gaze fixed on protecting Decree 88, the threat materialized in a far less obvious form: draft law 30/2018 on the National Registry of Enterprises, precipitously passed into law by parliament on July 27, 2018.
On the heels of Korea’s joint agreement with the African Development Bank including a $5 billion assistance commitment to Africa, Tunisia’s Ministry of Development has landed a piece of the deal. The Korea Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAPEC) fund has carved out a million-dollar grant towards a project that will deliver Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), more commonly known as drones, for data collection in Tunisia’s agricultural sector. Until now, drone use in Tunisia has been largely restricted under ministerial law of 6 April 1995. Will South Korea’s experiment influence lawmakers to devise new regulations and open Tunisia’s skies to a wider application of this technology?
After ongoing negotiations that began on July 15, 40 irregular migrants in territorial waters were brought to the commercial port of Zarzis after being intercepted on their way from Libya to Europe. On Wednesday, August 1, the migrants accepted landing in Tunisia as their legal status is settled to determine whether they will be deported or granted asylum. Their arrival on Tunisian soil marked the end of 18 perilous days at sea after the migrants were refused entry into European ports.
Tunisians are usually very pessimistic when they talk about the future of their country. Many see themselves as imprisoned in it. Those who manage to escape the country, through legal or illegal channels, are considered heroes. However, outside observers are somehow more optimistic with regards to the process initiated in 2011. These contradictory perceptions hide a misunderstanding as to the nature of the Tunisian revolution, its main actors, and its stakes.
According to official figures, 11 billion dinars are currently circulating outside the Tunisian banking system. This calls for a constant refinancing of banks by the Tunisian Central Bank, due to the resulting lack of liquidity. Many factors may account for this situation, namely the size of the informal sector and the low rate of bancarization standing at 47% of the population. While this has been the case for many years, the situation could deteriorate in 2018 and 2019.
