On May 10, Tunisian polling institution SIGMA Conseil and German foundation Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) presented the results of their survey “Religion and Politics in North Africa.” How accurately do study findings reflect society’s views on issues as elusive and multifaceted as religious and national identity?
The recently revealed emails of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shed light on a cast of key characters and their roles in informing the decisions, diplomatic phone calls, and initiatives that constitute US response to what was unfolding in Tunisia at the time of revolution.
When one remembers, that the 2011 uprising was primarily triggered by economic and social disparities and that now those disparities are not only growing, but that nothing has been done to narrow the gap, it suggests that social explosions will inevitably continue.
Voting in a corrupt, fraudulent election is providing legitimacy to organized financial crime. Not until basic transparency criteria are met, could we have a fair election on a national level. Considering the rotten political reality, the only alternative available is the street, as populist as it may sound.
If some will remember 2015 as the year Tunisia’s National Quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, others will recall that it was citizens’ struggles online and on the ground which kept the country on track.
Comparing the nature of political discourse and media response in the US and Tunisia following such tragedies reveals key debates that have been stirred up in each country, as well as some fundamental commonalities; namely, failure to face the underlying, internal factors that fuel terrorism.
Nearly five years into the democratic work in progress and in the immediate wake of a bomb explosion that killed 12 in the capital, demands for and promises of US support for the Arab Spring’s sole success appear increasingly tired and misguided.
Tunisia’s decision to undertake its own transitional justice process, largely encouraged and supported by the international community, was formalized nearly two years after the departure of long-time president Zine El-Abedine Ben Ali. How the country’s path to reconciliation will be measured in a global context and how its work will impact Tunisians remains very much uncertain. In the meantime, the growing library of precedent cases offers lessons and examples for Tunisia’s truth-seeking body as it works to carry out its mission in the face of political, structural, and strategic challenges.
Informal commerce is not limited to one category of merchandise, one geographic region, one demographic; trafficked items include weapons, food products, and gasoline and circulate the country via markets in Ben Guerdane, Kasserine, Sfax, Tunis; smugglers range from merchants of little means to prominent businessmen who are comparatively economically resilient and more likely to withstand trade restrictions imposed at the borders. For many smugglers of lesser means, survival depends upon their ability to navigate a political vision and legal framework which serve neither to sustain nor protect them.
Around mid-July, everyone, it seemed, was talking about the wall, a trench-lined sand barricade that is to stretch some 200 kilometers along Tunisia’s border with Libya. In the capital, a world away from the country’s borders, conversations are still based on hear-say, rumors, and speculation.
The facts are clear. The trial concerning the assassination of Chokri Belaid has been deferred, not a single terrorist crime has been tried, and the attack in Sousse has exposed security and political failures. Four years after the Rouhia case, it seems that the more insecurity has grown, the more opaque the security institution has become.
“Winou el pétrole?”—Where is the oil? began to draw the attention of the media since the end of May when citizens hit the street with signs, and has gained considerable visibility since last week when demonstrations in the capital and the south of the country turned into violent confrontations between protesters and security forces. Furthermore, doubts regarding the movement’s beginning as a spontaneous social media campaign and uncertainty about the authenticity of its objectives have stirred controversy and warranted the response of the political figure and government officials.
The agitation that a democratic model allows represents a prompt for open, substantial discussion, create space for questions to form and answers to be formulated, for awareness to shift and public opinion to fluctuate and controversy to take its course … For over a decade, Nawaat has been a platform many of whose contributors are quick to question, criticize, and call out the Tunisian and foreign governments for hypocrisy, complicity, exploit, corruption…the very symptoms of defective governance that were renounced by youth and activists and journalists of the so-called Arab Spring, the same individuals whom Western democracies and international agencies have so effusively commended for their courage and commitment to changing the status quo. And so inevitably it feels like something of a betrayal when requests for more specific information and questions regarding political motives are consistently held at bay, excluded from discussions, or, most conveniently, ignored.
In Tunisia’s case, there will likely be for many years to come the relentless push, from both without and within, for foreign governments and institutions to supply aid, support, assistance, and know-how to the end/under the pretext of promoting economic growth, social justice, and State accountability. In this context, will Tunisia allow outside interests and impositions to define its foreign relations and, by extension, its own autonomy? or will it remain vigilant, deliberate, and selective in decisions concerning relations with its geographical neighbors, economic ‘partners,’ and strategic ‘friends’?
If major political forces succeeded in controlling the Kasbah, it was largely due to inadequate management on the part of the youth who were the driving force of the occupation.
n their presidential electoral campaigns, both candidates used the same communication vehicles including public speeches, in-field visits with different number and destinations of visits, press conferences and TV interviews. The slogan of the electoral presidential campaign of both candidates focuses on the word “Tunisia.”
The prevalence of mud throwing and below-the-belt jabs, the blatant lack of engagement in the very social and economic issues that were at the heart of uprisings four years ago, are certainly not features of a political scene that promises the effective leadership or imminent reforms for which Tunisians have so hoped.
The symbolism of being the first and only female in the running for president is at once a defining strength and weakness of Kannou’s candidacy. Aside from this factor and given her dynamism in an election that is largely based on personality, Kannou’s lack of specific, pragmatic socio-economic project proposals limits her potential outstanding status amongst her political rivals in this election in spite of what international media might have liked to idealize.
